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Abstract 
Building information modelling (BIM) plays an important role in furthering value-creation of 
construction projects by advocating the inter-firm cooperation. When implementing BIM, 
however, individual firms inherently safeguard their self-interests regardless of the fact that 
inter-firm cooperation might reap joint BIM benefits for a project overall, which epitomizes a 
typical problem of moral hazards in project-based organizations. This paper develops an 
outcome-linked benefit sharing model that considers sharing joint BIM benefits among 
stakeholders including designers, contractors, and clients for tracking moral hazards therein. 
By modeling stakeholders’ behaviors as evolutionary games within a principal–agent 
formalism, it has been deducted that (1) designers/contractors could be incentivized to 
cooperate had each stakeholder received a share higher than the quotient of BIM costs over 
value-creation in the design/construction phase; and (2) how joint BIM benefits can be more 
than noncooperation outcomes is key for clients to support BIM implementation. 
Keywords: Building Information Modeling, Inter-firm Cooperation, Moral Hazards, 
Principal-Agent Theory, Evolutionary Game Model 
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Introduction  
The tremendous construction demand has kindled a global interest in implementing building 
information modeling (BIM) in the architecture, engineering and construction (AEC) industry 
(Chen et al. 2015). Confronting intense competitions, sharp cost pressures, and the value-
creation demand, AEC firms find it difficult to develop so far as the project fragmentation is 
concerned (Ceric 2012), particularly in the Design Bid and Building (DBB) model prevailing 
in the industry (MacLeamy 2004). BIM offers a platform for information sharing between firms, 
and is recognized as able to add value to projects by enhancing management interoperability, 
integration, efficiency, and effectiveness (Eastman et al. 2011). As such, BIM could help move 
the project management from intra-firm order towards inter-firm cooperation (Eadie et al. 
2013), and is described to be so advantaged that it will bring a paradigm shift to the AEC 
industry (Eastman et al. 2011). 
Despite its virtues, BIM has not yet made a decisive step from pilot-alike or particular-
purposed cases to widespread applications, wherein the euphoria around BIM is yet to be seen. 
It immediately begs the question of why AEC firms stand aloof from using BIM 
notwithstanding its advantages reported by researchers. To some extent, existing studies have 
addressed BIM implementation barriers such as technological factors (Redmond et al. 2012), 
human elements (Bryde et al. 2013), and financial influences (Son et al. 2015). Nevertheless, 
there leaves a sense of lacking attentions to the conflict between individual maximization and 
inter-firm cooperation. On the basis of economics and organization theories, firms are self-
interested individuals and behave in a way that best serves their own utilities (Hatch and 
Cunliffe 2013). Meanwhile, firms’ activities are limited by their imperfect information, 
cognitive limitations and finite time, involving costly safeguarding of, and competition for, 
individual maximizations (Williamson 1973; Simon 1982). For implementing BIM, it engages 
clients and AEC firms that mainly fall into designers and contractors. Whilst clients often play 
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a dominant role in promoting BIM, they actually rely on AEC firms’ expertise and resources 
for BIM implementations—such ties are typical principal-agent (PA) relations, where bounded 
rational AEC firms (agencies) focusing on self-interests may well act inappropriately from the 
client’s (the principal’s) viewpoint, were their interests not aligned (Ross 1973; Postrel 2009).  
Firstly, as information sharing is indispensably required, using BIM is often associated 
with revealing firms’ proprietary information. Firms are apt to presume that by doing so would 
invite intensified competitions and monitoring from other firms, and cause losses to their vested 
benefits that are known as the proprietary cost (e.g. Berger and Hann 2007). Being required to 
use BIM, AEC firms thus are facing tradeoffs between BIM benefits and their proprietary costs. 
When BIM benefits are uncertain in comparison with present pictures of proprietary costs, 
decisions favoring using BIM would be very unlikely. Secondly, as one profound purport of 
BIM is to offer a commonly accessible information platform (Hess and Ostrom 2003), 
implementing BIM encounters the puzzle of ‘common-pool’ resources in a narrow path. In the 
relevant literature, given ‘common-pool’ resources, inefficient outcomes are frequently found, 
predominantly owing to individuals’ free-riding and over-competition (e.g. Camerer 2003; 
Duffy and Ochs 2009). Given a BIM-based information platform, AEC firms are also inclined 
to free-riding and over-competition for obtaining possibly higher benefits than before. These 
firms, meanwhile, would try for safeguarding their gained benefits. Because free-riding, self-
interest safeguarding, and over-competition are all costly behaviors (Williamson 1973), in any 
event, firms’ previous cost-benefit equilibria could become unbalanced and probably move to 
lower levels. Consequently, no firm would genuinely cooperate even though corporately using 
BIM is desired from the collective view. This epitomizes a classical problem existing in 
project-based organizations, as being labeled by scholars as the moral hazard dilemma, which 
can be prejudicial to both joint outcomes and individual utilities (Gintis 2009). 
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How to tackle moral hazards in a PA relation has long been a challenging problem for 
scholars (Hess and Ostrom 2003; Obloj and Zemsky 2015). Researchers unanimously consent 
that, cooperation is intricately associated with communications, norms, and institutions. While 
norms and communications actually motivate firms to obey institutions (Arrighetti et al. 1997), 
incentives and punishments are core issues of institutional arrangements (Hess and Ostrom 
2003). This paper hence resorts to incentive-alignment for encouraging inter-firm cooperation 
for BIM implementation. An outcome-linked benefit sharing model (OLBSM) is developed by 
modeling stakeholders’ behaviors as evolutionary games within a principal–agent formalism. 
The OLBSM considers sharing joint BIM benefits among stakeholders (i.e. designers, 
contractors, and clients) for delivering DBB projects. Being subject to a determined 
environment, this study has both methodological and practical implications to other settings 
purposing on promoting BIM. 
Existing incentives of using BIM and emerging challenges  
The BIM implementation literature has sprung up over recent years. These studies are mainly 
geared towards inductive models for technological, organizational, or financial-based 
initiatives to overcome barriers to BIM adoption. Among these studies, Redmond et al. (2012) 
strive efforts to expand BIM applications by introducing a web service. Cao et al. (2016) 
propose four categories of BIM incentives from regulation, cooperation image, and revenue 
based upon experiences of China. Son et al. (2015), Arayici et al. (2011) and many other 
scholars study organizational factors such as the firms’ culture that could hinder them from 
adopting BIM. Scholars also inspiringly argue that, as using BIM is costlier during design 
phases but more profitable for construction phases (Lu et al. 2014), a fee structure change for 
stakeholders fairly assuming BIM costs could offer proper incentives (Bryde et al. 2013). 
Another inspiring approach is to apply the integrated project delivery modeling (IPDM) to 
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BIM-based projects (e.g. Sebastian 2011), where the key has been recognized as aligning 
stakeholders’ incentives and goals of BIM implementation (Chang 2014).  
As insightful as previous studies are, there are still deficiencies that require further 
exploration. Firstly, existing approaches including fee structure changes and the IPDM fail in 
characterizing their functions with details. Secondly, while there are scholars arguing that firms’ 
different targets prevent them from coalition (e.g. Manu et al. 2015), they stop before going 
deeper into essential reasons. Thirdly, existing models for promoting BIM do not explicitly 
include firms’ self-interests and bounded rationalities, resulting in consequences diverging 
from their original intentions. For instance, under cost-switching policies, a firm may increase 
the BIM budget only for obtaining higher profits instead of truly using it, as an increased BIM 
budget might be borne by other firms.  
Above discussions trenchantly point out that, what is lacking is the attention to moral 
hazards in BIM implementation and illuminating coping strategies. What will be useful is a 
managerial concept that helps AEC firms overcome strong temptations to moral hazard 
behaviors. What is currently needed thus is a risk-free and costless method of demonstrating 
effects of sharing joint BIM benefits on stakeholders’ behaviors when implementing BIM. 
Methodology and research strategy 
Methodology. This study seeks for developing an outcome-linked benefit sharing model 
(OLBSM) to incentivize inter-firm cooperation in the context of BIM implementation. The 
model development is grounded in the principal-agent (PA) theory and follows the deductive 
reasoning approach. The OLBSM is regarded as an ex-ante approach of sharing ex-post joint 
BIM benefits between clients (the principal) and designers/contractors (i.e. AEC firms, 
agencies). Among methods for governing PA relations, evolutionary game models have 
produced optimal collaboration results in laboratories (e.g. Groves and Ledyard 1977; Camerer 
2003). In a similar vein, this study models BIM implementations as evolutionary games 
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between stakeholders, where one stakeholder moves by considering other stakeholders’ 
possible moves. A positive move (cooperation) is an action for a stakeholder to bear no more 
cost than the intrinsic production cost, which would not be the case without heading towards 
an aligned target. Punishment (e.g. increased costs of moves) for negative moves 
(noncooperation) hence is frequently paired with rewards of positive moves.  
The four-step research strategy (Fig. 1). The starting point is to identify moral hazards 
in BIM implementation by investigating how BIM is being used and how it affects stakeholders’ 
costs and benefits. This is done by carrying out a content analysis based on retrieved 37 
scholarly papers and 19 industrial reports, where 52 real cases of BIM implementation are 
covered. For a coherent discourse of this study, details of the content analysis method and 
analytical results are given in the Appendix. The second step is to offer an explicit 
characterization of the value creation possibility if stakeholders all cooperate. In the third step, 
the relationship between sharing joint BIM benefits and stakeholders’ behaviors of 
implementing BIM is computed. Finally, an execution procedure is suggested for applying the 
proposed OLBSM to BIM-based projects. 
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Fig. 1 The four-step research strategy 
Existing BIM implementation patterns 
By reviewing the retrieved 52 real cases, it is found that BIM has been being used in mainly 
three ways, namely, the (1) inter-firm communication (e.g. designers communicating with 
clients), (2) intra-firm coordination (e.g. contractors arranging construction tasks), and (3) 
inter-firm coordination (e.g. contractors submitting request for information (RFI) to designers). 
The first two ways denote particular-purposed BIM scopes, and the third way includes lifecycle 
BIM implementations. In the reviewed literature, lifecycle BIM implementations are much less 
frequently documented compared with particular-purposed BIM scopes.  
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Out of reviewed 52 real cases, only 6 ones are reported as lifecycle BIM 
implementations, including Midfield Terminal (Abu Dhabi), Ministry of Justice (the UK), 
Sutter Medical Center (the US), University of Colorado Denver Research II (the US), Cathay 
Pacific Cargo Terminal (Hong Kong) and Vancouver Convention Center (British Columbia). 
The rest 46 cases emphasize BIM capabilities from particular stakeholders’ perspectives. For 
example, in “Aquarium Hilton Garden Inn (Azhar et al. 2008)”, the general contractor 
developed a BIM that was useful for reducing rework and organizing subcontractors. In the 
design phase of “Villeneuve La Garenne (McGraw Hill Construction 2010)” that was 
complexly structured, designers designed with BIM that helped to enhance design 
productivities and facilitated communications with the client and perspective tenants. 
Unfortunately, no further applications of BIM were reported for these projects.  
The lack of lifecycle BIM implementations may be attributable to particular capabilities 
of BIM demanded by different projects. Yet the later discussion lends more credits to the 
argument that, particular-purposed BIM scopes might have been “the least costly (most 
beneficial)” ways of using BIM. Had they used BIM more in-depth than their individually 
preferred levels, AEC firms would have confronted off-balanced, or even reversed, cost-benefit 
relationships.  
Mapping costs and benefits of BIM implementation  
Facilitated by BIM, inter-firm cooperation and management activities can be enhanced such as 
mitigating uncertainties in schedules and budgets. On the other hand, as using BIM requires 
firms to manage projects collaboratively and interdependently, managerial issues become more 
expensive and create new costs to AEC firms compared with a traditional AEC process. 
Between particular-purposed BIM scopes and lifecycle BIM implementations, one 
distinguishing factor is the resulting costs and benefits of designers and contractors as direct 
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BIM implementers. For yielding explanations to AEC firms’ lethargic use of BIM, it is useful 
to firstly identify influences of using BIM on their benefits regarding costs it involves. 
Pertinent benefits and costs in the design phase 
In the design phase, it has been agreed that BIM helps improve design productivities, as it is 
useful for efficiently identifying and correcting design errors (Arayici et al. 2011), and saving 
time and staffing (e.g. Giel and Issa 2011). Using BIM, designers now can do their work more 
efficiently and flexibly than before (e.g. Taylor and Bernstein 2009). The quality of BIM-based 
designs is also agreed as more reliable than designs of 2D drawings (e.g. Arayici et al. 2011). 
Moreover, BIM also can expand designers’ business by facilitating collaborative design and 
offering quality and new services to clients (e.g. Taylor and Bernstein 2009).  
Meanwhile, designers have to assume new costs imposed by using BIM. To date, the 
commonly recognized BIM costs occurred in the design phase are technology costs of 
hardware, software, information infrastructure, and technical support (e.g. Becerik-Gerber and 
Rice 2010); and organizational costs for activities such as reviewing BIM-based decision-
makings (e.g. DPR Construction 2010). Besides, comparing with designing in traditional ways, 
designing with BIM costs designers much more intellectual efforts (e.g. Kaner et al. 2008), as 
well as involves considerable costs of labor training (e.g. Rico 2006), managing overwhelming 
information (e.g. Love et al. 2013) and data-checking (e.g. McGraw Hill Construction 2010).  
Pertinent benefits and costs in the construction phase 
In the construction phase, it is reported that BIM can facilitate diminishing reworks (e.g. Azhar 
et al. 2008), and produce shop drawings (e.g. Azhar 2011) and construction documents (e.g. 
Kaner et al. 2008). Meanwhile, contractors can update the BIM information and develop it into 
an ‘as-built’ BIM that depicts details of how a building has been built (e.g. Tang et al. 2010). 
An ‘as-built’ is useful for the construction work by extensively supporting activities such as 
process control (Song et al. 2012) and quality assessment (Tang et al. 2010). With BIM 
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capabilities as rehearsed above, both construction productivities and building qualities can be 
improved (e.g. Kerosuo and Paavola 2016).  
Additional costs are also incurred in the construction phase. When building with BIM, 
contractors often have to repurpose a BIM model for their own requirements or even reproduce 
it (e.g. Becerik-Gerber and Rice 2010). Moreover, although it is useful for contractors, an ‘as-
built’ BIM can only be developed by enriching BIM objects with geometric and non-geometric 
information of building objects, which causes considerable costs to contractors for solving 
problems such as incompatible technologies (e.g. Bryde et al. 2013) and labor training (e.g. 
Becerik-Gerber and Rice 2010). Besides, as the construction phase engages many partners such 
as subcontractors, suppliers, and logistics, the BIM-based construction engenders significant 
organizational costs for contractors to coordinate their partners to work around BIM, and adapt 
their customary workflows to BIM-aided processes (e.g. Merschbrock and Rolfsen 2016).  
Imbalances of designers and contractors’ costs and benefits  
While BIM benefits occurred in the design phase are appreciable, these benefits are not 
digested by designers solely, rather, they are concurrently enjoyed by clients and perhaps 
contractors. Firstly, the increased productivities attributable to designers’ efforts at least 
practically account for clients’ revenue by also saving their time and cost. Secondly, as BIM-
based design offers detailed and accurate information about buildings (e.g. Arayici et al. 2011), 
clients could more efficiently undertake activities such as budgeting and tender-evaluating than 
before (e.g. Staub-French et al. 2011). Further, as a quality BIM-based design allows rework-
reducing, less RFI, and many other in-depth analyses in the construction phase, designers’ 
contributions to BIM actually provide handsome benefits to clients and contractors.  
Contractors’ previous cost-benefit equilibrium also could be affected by implementing 
BIM. While the costly development of an ‘as-built’ BIM is essential for enhancing construction 
productivities (e.g. Tang et al. 2010), at least a part of improved productivities might ultimately 
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become clients’ revenue depending on the contract between clients and contractors. Moreover, 
in general cases, any as-built drawings are delineated as clients’ property (e.g. Goedert and 
Meadati 2008). Clients hence could obtain significant benefits from an ‘as-built’ BIM that is 
valuable for facility management (FM) and building operations (e.g. Teicholz 2013). Without 
a benefit sharing approach, under prevailing conditions, clients thus would derive extreme 
values from contractors and designers’ contributions to BIM implementation considering the 
cost-benefit across a project lifecycle. 
Disequilibrium of cost-benefit translated into moral hazards  
Since BIM-imposed costs are generally borne by clients, there seems to be nothing that 
impedes AEC firms’ extensively using BIM, even though the major BIM benefits are 
distributed to the client’s hands. The supposed extensive BIM implementation, however, is far 
from true as discussed above. This paradox suggests that the moral hazard dilemma could be a 
vital issue existing in BIM implementation environments, which might result in a number of 
undesired consequences. 
When the client recruits a designer, a designer who bids lower prices for producing 
BIM might be more competitive. After a designer who raised a low BIM budget being retained, 
rather than produce a quality BIM-based design, the designer might simply produce a BIM 
cutting the edge that is not more than a communication tool. What makes things worse is that 
it is often costly and time-communing for clients to examine the quality of a BIM-based design 
(Schade et al. 2011). For example, while a quality BIM-based design is useful for reducing 
rework and has sufficient constructability, these qualities perhaps can only be well proved 
during or even after the construction phase. Consequently, designers’ inclination to not offering 
a quality BIM becomes higher. It has been reported that BIM has been only most often used in 
early periods of design phases and progressively less used in later periods (e.g. Eadie et al. 
2013), which could offer side evidences to designers’ adverse behaviors of using BIM.  
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Subsequent to designers’ possibly improper behaviors, contractors’ cost-benefit would 
be affected when taking over the project. Under a lump-sum construction contract, with the 
availability of a BIM-based design, the client might expect a lower budget for the construction 
phase than before. Contractors immediately have chances to bear losses of decreased overhead, 
or even costs of reproducing a BIM model if designers’ BIM turns out to be inferior. Worse 
still is the restriction of a DBB process that separates the construction from the design phase. 
Subject to a lower construction budget, it is quite possible for contractors to implement BIM 
in its easiest functions (e.g. visualization) and fail in developing an ‘as-built’ BIM. Under the 
cost-plus or guaranteed maximum price contracts where the budget is revisable, contractors 
have more incentives to claim extra BIM budget in name only, instead of truly contributing to 
BIM implementation and developing an ‘as-built’ BIM. As reported by Goedert and Meadati 
(2008), in many BIM-based projects, the construction information still is in terms of 2D 
drawings. Huber et al. (2011) also find that BIM handed over from contractors to clients 
frequently contains not much more than the design information. It hence is not surprising that, 
as valuable as it is for FM, BIM implementations are much less often documented in the FM 
phase than in other phases, as found by Goedert and Meadati (2008) and suggested by results 
of the content analysis in this paper (Table 3). 
The OLBSM of BIM implementation   
The value-creation possibility enabled by BIM 
Assume that the BIM implementation degree is infinitely divisible, joint BIM benefits can be 
deducted as shown in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2, two vertical scales denoting BIM implementation 
degrees and associated costs, and one horizontal scale representing the process of project 
deliveries. For the entire project, assume the optimal BIM use degree is 𝐵∗; and for designers 
and contractors, let their private optimal BIM use degrees be 𝐵#$%&'()*∗ 	(𝑖=designer, contractor). 
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The total cost of a construction project (marked as 𝐶./.'0) is 𝐶./.'01∗  and 𝐶./.'0123456789∗  when BIM is 
used in degrees of 𝐵∗ and 𝐵#$%&'()*∗  respectively. Designers and contractors’ BIM costs are 
functions of their BIM use degrees (denoted as 𝑓(𝐵#$%&'()*∗ )). In Fig. 2, curves of 𝐶./.'0 
and	𝑓(𝐵#$%&'()*∗ ) all diminishingly increase with the project process (the x-axis) and the BIM 
implementation degree (the y-axis on the left). The three cost curves have similar shapes, which 
indicate that the marginal costs imposed by using BIM to designers, contractors, and the overall 
project could decrease after designers and contractors getting sophisticated in implementing 
BIM, as well as BIM benefits being scaled.  
If designers and contractors both cooperate, i.e. use BIM at 𝐵∗, they will face increased 
costs in terms of 𝑓(𝐵∗) − 𝑓(𝐵#$%&'()*∗ ). Meanwhile, when BIM is being used at 𝐵∗, the 𝐶./.'0 
is at its minimum level (𝐶./.'01∗ ). Had designers and contractors expanded their BIM use degrees 
from 𝐵#$%&'()*∗  to 𝐵∗ , the 𝐶./.'0  could be reduced. Therefore, the difference 𝐶./.'0123456789∗ −𝐶./.'01∗ > 0 is the joint BIM benefits for an entire project, which cannot be realized if AEC firms 
act privately. Further, when the decrease in 𝐶./.'0  is higher than the sum of increases in 
designers and contractors’ costs, i.e. 𝑓 𝐵∗ − f(𝐵#$%&'()*∗ ) ≤ 𝐶./.'0123456789∗ − 𝐶./.'01∗ , by passing 
back shares of joint BIM benefits (𝐶./.'0123456789∗ − 𝐶./.'01∗ ) to cover designers/contractors’ increased 
costs for using BIM at 𝐵∗, they could be incentivized to cooperate for implementing BIM for 
the sake of a project overall. 
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Fig. 2 Joint BIM benefits derived from stakeholders’ cooperation 
The baseline of benefit sharing  
Provided that joint BIM benefits satisfy the condition of 𝑓 𝐵∗ − f(𝐵#$%&'()*∗ ) ≤ 𝐶./.'0123456789∗ −𝐶./.'01∗ , it is necessary to perform the OLBSM according to a baseline that, a stakeholder who 
uses BIM at 𝐵∗ would receive benefits not lower than such stakeholder’s vested benefits when 
using BIM at 𝐵#$%&'()*∗ . Otherwise, the stakeholder is inclined to moral hazard behaviors or 
simply drops the project. This baseline hence consists of two concepts. The first concept 
concerns protecting agencies’ (designers and contractors’) interests by defining that, agencies’ 
costs of using BIM at 𝐵∗ should be less than, or at least equal to, their costs of using BIM at 
their private optimal degrees (𝐵#$%&'()*∗ ). The second concept is for protecting the principal’s 
(the client’s) interest that, the principal should at least get that much benefits when agencies 
have used BIM at 𝐵#$%&'()*∗ . Each agency hence should receive benefits derived from using 
BIM at 𝐵∗ in a ratio of the value added by such agency in terms of cost-savings. These two 
concepts can be expressed as:  
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Value added by the client = project value − total project budget, or  𝑉𝐴D0*)$. = 𝑃G(/H)D. − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡                                                                    (1)                                                                         
Value added by agencies = decreases in the design/construction budget − agencies’ 
additional BIM costs, or 𝑉𝐴* = ∆𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡* − [𝑓(𝐵∗) − 𝑓(𝐵#$%&'()∗ )*]                                                        (2)                                             
Therefore, each stakeholder can receive a share of joint BIM benefits as calculated by: β* = VWXVWXYZ , (𝑗	 = 	𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)	                                             (3)                                        
Following the above-specified baseline, the OLBSM could protect all stakeholders’ 
interests in corporately using BIM by aligning their individual-maximization functions.  
Obtaining BIM benefit sharing ratios  
Defining the BIM implementation environment  
Consider a DBB construction project, where using BIM is stipulated by contracts between 
clients and designers/contractors. Define the environment as two project phases, namely, the 
design phase and the construction phase. The client is the facility operator and to invest in BIM 
implementation, and owns the BIM used by the contractor at the end of the construction phase. 
Suited in this environment, the client’s positive strategy is carefully evaluating agencies’ 
BIM implementations and supporting exploring BIM applications, and the negative strategy is 
actions on the opposite. Regarding agencies, designers’ positive strategy is to offer a developed 
BIM-based design that elaborates detailed building descriptions and technical specifications of 
the project, and their negative strategy is producing a conceptual BIM-based design containing 
very limited information; and contractors’ positive strategy is using BIM extensively and 
developing an ‘as-built’ BIM, and their negative strategy is using BIM superficially and only 
submitting a BIM containing not much more than the design information to the client.  
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Presume that the ex-post joint BIM benefits are indefinitely divisible into the unit 
benefit. To convey the principal’s incentives-monitoring to agencies, the ex-ante benefit 
sharing should be linked with agencies’ actual outcomes of using BIM. Designers’ share of 
BIM benefit hence also depends on contractors’ behaviors according to a DBB process. In this 
regard, the game of stakeholders’ BIM implementations can be separated into two parts, viz., 
one part between the client and the designer, and the other part between the client and the 
contractor.  
Define joint BIM benefits as 𝑆𝐸 = 𝜛 + ℎ𝜉	(𝜉 > 0; 	ℎ > 1), where	𝜛 denotes the unit 
benefit (cost-saving) had all players acted negatively and might be a negative value. As clients’ 
positive strategies confine and stimulate designers’ positive strategies, it is reasonable to 
assume that the same unit benefit can be derived from either clients’ or designers’ positive 
strategy (marked as 𝜉). Further, let ℎ𝜉 denote the unit benefit derived from all stakeholders’ 
positive strategies. Along with a DBB process, ℎ𝜉 cannot be observed in the design phase, so 
that a part of designers’ share of BIM benefits has to be redeemed after the construction phase.  
Sharing joint BIM benefits between the client and the designer 
Along with a DBB process, it is firstly to stipulate the OLBSM between clients and designers. 
Being bounded rational individuals, both clients and designers have to go through learning 
processes in terms of trial-error-adjustments before finally finding out their optimal adaptation 
paths in BIM implementation environments. In terminologies of evolutionary games, a 
stakeholder’s optimal adaptation path is termed as an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) when 
participating a game. The BIM benefit sharing ratios thus can be computed by identifying 
stakeholders’ ESSs when being engaged in BIM implementation.  
The pay-off matrix for a single round of the game is given in Table 1, where βD0*)$. and βi)%.  denote clients and designers’ BIM benefit shares respectively, and 𝐶i)%. and 𝐶D0*)$.k  
denote designers and clients’ costs of performing their positive strategies. When clients’ (or 
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designers’) positive strategy A (or C) is an ESS of the game, it can be interpreted as that, in a 
market consisting of numerous similar clients (or designers), a client (or a designer) who adopts 
the negative strategy B (or D) receive strictly lower payoffs than what adopters of strategy A 
(or C) would receive. Provided that when A is clients’ ESS, C happens to be designers’ ESS, 
then (A, C) is an ESS pair of the game between the designer and the client.  
Table 1 The payoff matrix between the client and the designer 
Designer/Client A (Evaluating carefully and supporting BIM 
exploration) 
B (Evaluating loosely and not 
supporting BIM exploration) C
 (C
onceptual 
B
IM
-based 
design) βi)%. 𝜛 + ℎ𝜉 − 𝐶i)%., βD0*)$. 𝜛 + ℎ𝜉 − 𝐶D0*)$.k 	 βi)%. 𝜛 + 𝜉 − 𝐶i)%., βD0*)$. 𝜛 + 𝜉 	
D
 (D
eveloped 
B
IM
-based 
design)	 βi)%. 𝜛 + 𝜉 , βD0*)$. 𝜛 + 𝜉 − 𝐶D0*)$.k 	 βi)%.𝜛, βD0*)$.𝜛	
 
Given individual stakeholders’ bounded rationalities, which strategies to adopt for 
single rounds of games can be assumed as following probabilistic functions. Denote 𝑥 (or 𝑦) 
as the probability for the designer (or the client) to adopt strategy C (or A). Any time looking 
up the status (s) in the design phase, the two players’ next strategies have a probability function:  s = 𝑥, 1 − 𝑥 , 𝑦, 1 − 𝑦 , (𝑥 ∈ 0,1 , 𝑦 ∈ [0,1])                                                           (4) 
Let 𝑟k = (1, 0) denote the status where either player chooses the positive strategy (A 
or C) at a probability of 1, and 𝑟p = (1, 0) denote that either player chooses the negative 
strategy (B or D) at a probability of 1. At status s, let 𝑓i)%.(𝑟k, 𝑠) be the weighted sum of 
probable payoffs (WSP) when the designer adopts C, and let 𝑓i)%*.(𝑟p, 𝑠) be the WSP when 
the designer adopts D. There thus exist: 𝑓i)%*. 𝑟k, 𝑠 = 𝑦 βi)%. 𝜛 + ℎ𝜉 − 𝐶i)%. + 1 − 𝑦 βi)%. 𝜛 + ℎ𝜉 − 𝐶i)%.                   (5) 𝑓i)%*. 𝑟p, 𝑠 = 𝑦βi)%. 𝜛 + ℎ𝜉 + (1 − 𝑦)βi)%.𝜛                                                             (6)             
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The general format (𝑓i)%*.(𝑥, 𝑠) ) of the designer’s WSP hence can be represented as: 𝑓i)%*. 𝑥, 𝑠 = 𝑥𝑓i)%*. 𝑟k, 𝑠 + (1 − 𝑥)𝑓i)%*. 𝑟p, 𝑠                                                           (7)                      
Likewise, for the client, there exist: 	𝑓D0*)$. 𝑟k, 𝑠 = 𝑥 βD0*)$. 𝜛 + ℎ𝜉 − 𝐶D0*)$.k + 1 − 𝑥 βD0*)$. 𝜛 + 𝜉 − 𝐶D0*)$.k        (8)        	𝑓D0*)$. 𝑟p, 𝑠 = 𝑥[βD0*)$. 𝜛 + 𝜉 ] + (1 − 𝑥)βD0*)$.𝜛                                                     (9)              	𝑓D0*)$. 𝑦, 𝑠 = 𝑦𝑓D0*)$. 𝑟k, 𝑠 + (1 − 𝑦)𝑓D0*)$. 𝑟p, 𝑠                                                     (10)      
Let ∅ 𝑥 = 𝑥[𝑓i)%*. 𝑟k, 𝑠 − 𝑓i)%*. 𝑥, 𝑠 ] and ∅ 𝑦 = 𝑦[𝑓D0*)$. 𝑟k, 𝑠 − 𝑓D0*)$. 𝑦, 𝑠  
be the dynamic replicator functions that respectively describe growth rates for designers and 
clients to approach their positive strategies (A and C), therefore, ∅ 𝑥 = 𝑥[𝑓i)%*. 𝑟k, 𝑠 − 𝑓i)%*. 𝑥, 𝑠 ] = 𝑥(1 − 𝑥)[ βi)%.𝜉 − 𝐶i)%*. + 𝑦βi)%.𝜉 ℎ − 2 ]              (11) ∅ 𝑦 = 𝑦[𝑓D0*)$. 𝑟k, 𝑠 − 𝑓D0*)$. 𝑦, 𝑠 ] = 𝑦(1 − 𝑦)[𝑥βD0*)$.𝜉(ℎ − 2) + βD0*)$.𝜉 − 𝐶D0*)s.k ]        (12) 
According to the conceptual of ESS, when ∅ 𝑥 =0 (or ∅ 𝑦 =0), it indicates that the 
adopted strategy stops varying and becomes the static point for the designer (or the client). 
Solving Eq.11 and Eq.12 together, five static points can be computed as	𝐸k(0,0), 𝐸p(0,1), 𝐸t(1,0) , 𝐸u(1,1) , and 𝐸v(𝐶D0*)$.k − βD0*)$.𝜉)/𝜉βD0*)$.(ℎ − 2), (βi)%.𝜉 − 𝐶k)/βi)%.𝜉 2 − ℎ ) . For 
equilibrium analyses of the five static points, the Jacobi Matrix (Friedman 1991) is introduced 
as Eq. 13: 
𝐽 = {i∅ ziz i∅ zi{i∅ {iz i∅ {i{ }                                                                                                                   (13)                                                      
= { 1 − 2𝑥 βi)%.𝜉 − 𝐶k + 𝑦βi)%.𝜉 ℎ − 2 , 𝑥 1 − 𝑥 βi)%.𝜉 ℎ − 2𝑦 1 − 𝑦 βD0*)$.𝜉 ℎ − 2 , 1 − 2𝑦 𝑥βD0*)$.𝜉 ℎ − 2 + βD0*)$.𝜉 − 𝐶D0*)$.k } 
The determinant of the Jacobi Matrix (det 𝐽) and the matrix trace (tr 𝐽) are:  𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝐽 = 1 − 2𝑥 1 − 2𝑦 [(βi)%. 𝜉 − 𝐶i)%*.) + 𝑦βi)%.𝜉(ℎ − 2)][𝑥βD0*)$.𝜉(2 − ℎ) − 𝐶D0*)$.k −βD0*)$.𝜉] + 𝑥𝑦βi)%.βD0*)$.(1 − 𝑥)(1 − 𝑦)𝜉p(ℎ − 2)p                                                                 (14)                 
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tr 𝐽 = 1 − 2𝑥 βi)%.𝜉 − 𝐶i)%*. + 𝑦βi)%.𝜉 ℎ − 2 + 1 − 2𝑦 [𝑥βD0*)$.𝜉 2 − ℎ − βD0*)$.𝜉 −𝐶D0*)$.k ]                                                                                                                                     (15)                                                                                                                                           
Replace static points from 𝐸k to 𝐸v to Eq.14 and Eq.15 (Table 2). If a 𝐸* (𝑖 = 1~5) 
simultaneously satisfies 𝑑𝑒𝑡 𝐽 > 0 and 𝑡𝑟𝐽 < 0, then  𝐸*  is an optimal pair of both players’ 
ESSs in the game.  
Table 2 Partial stationary analyses of five equilibrium points 
Static points Jacobi matrix determinants Matrix trace 𝐸k(0,0) βi)%.𝜉 − 𝐶i)%*. (βD0*)$.𝜉 − 𝐶D0*)$.k ) 𝜉 − 𝐶i)%*. − 𝐶D0*)$.k  𝐸p(0,1) βi)%.𝜉 ℎ − 1 − 𝐶i)%*. [𝐶D0*)$.k − (βD0*)$.𝜉] 𝐶D0*)$.k − 𝐶i)%*. + 𝜉(βi)%.ℎ − 1) 𝐸t(1,0) 𝐶i)%*. − βi)%.𝜉 [βD0*)$.𝜉 ℎ − 1 − 𝐶D0*)$.k  𝐶i)%*. − 𝐶D0*)$.k + 𝜉[βD0*)$.ℎ − 1] 𝐸u(1,1) βi)%.𝜉 ℎ − 1 − 𝐶i)%*. [βD0*)$.𝜉(ℎ − 1) − 𝐶D0*)$.k ] 𝐶i)%*. + 𝐶D0*)$.k − 𝜉(ℎ − 1) 𝐸v(𝑥, 𝑦) −𝑥𝑦(1 − 𝑥)βi)%.𝜉 ℎ − 1 (1 − 𝑦)βD0*)$.𝜉 ℎ − 2  0 
Equilibrium analysis of benefit sharing in the design phase 
When 𝜉 = 849.84.  or  983Z983,  the Jacobi Matrix determinants equal zero. A conditional analysis 
on values of 𝜉, 849.84. , and 983Z983 hence is the same way of identifying which pairs of strategies 
are ESS pairs of the game between the client and the designer.  
Proposition I: If 1 < ℎ < 2, the sufficient condition for designers to cooperate is  βi)%. > 849. .  
Proof: when 849. < βi)%. < 849.983983Z ,  or βi)%. > 849.983983Z > k and 1 < ℎ < 3Z 849.983 , 𝐸t(1,0) is the ESS; when 84.849. > 983983Z > k and 983Z 849. + 1 < ℎ < 2, 𝐸u(1,1) is the ESS; 
and 849. > k . 
The scenario of 1 < ℎ < 2 describes a situation in which joint BIM benefits are rather 
mild even though stakeholders all adopt positive strategies. Under this condition, if designers’ 
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share is higher than 849. , they would contribute to BIM implementation. Only when 983983Z >
k and 983Z 849. + 1 < ℎ < 2 , the client is to support BIM implementation positively. 
Proposition II: If 2 < ℎ < 983Z983 + 1, the sufficient condition for designers to cooperate is  βi)%. > 849.  . 
Proof: When 849. < βi)%. < 849.983983Z , if 2 < ℎ < 983Z983 + 1,  𝐸t(1,0) is the ESS; when βi)%. > 849.983983Z > k, 𝐸u(1,1) is the ESS; and 849. > k . 
Proposition III: If ℎ > 983Z983 + 1 > 2, the sufficient condition for both designers and clients 
to cooperate is βi)%. > 849. 	. 
Proof: When 849. < βi)%. < 849.983983Z , if ℎ > 983Z983 + 1 > 2 , 𝐸u(1,1)  is the ESS; when βi)%. > 849.983983Z > k, 𝐸u(1,1) is the ESS; and 849. > k. 
Propositions II and III describe situations in which joint BIM benefits are significant if 
stakeholders all cooperate. In this case, as long as βi)%. > 849. , designers and clients’ utility 
functions could be successfully aligned. When ℎ is even higher than 983Z983 + 1, the ESS is 
converging to 𝐸u(1,1) , suggesting both the designer and the client would adopt positive 
strategies when implementing BIM.  
A more general analysis could be done by analyzing the scenario of ℎ = 2. Assume 𝐶D0*)$.k > 𝐶i)%*., and replace ℎ = 2 into Eq.14 and Eq.15, then 𝐸v(983983Z983 p& , 84.849.84. p& ) 
would be the saddle point of the game. In Fig. 3, the ESS pair depends on the saddle point 
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𝐸v(983983Z983 p& , 84.849.84. p& ). If 𝐸v originally lands in zone I, the competing system is more 
probable to converge to 𝐸u after trail-error adjustments.  
 
Fig. 3 The adaptive evolution of the game when ℎ ≥ 2 
Sharing joint BIM benefits between the client and the contractor 
In the construction phase, it is to share the remaining joint BIM benefits between the client and 
the contractor for delivering a BIM-based project. By analogizing the game between the client 
and the designer, it can be deducted that the sufficient condition for the contractor to cooperate 
is  βD/$. > 3.  subject to the different values of ℎ, where 𝜇 is the additional unit benefit (cost-
savings) derived from either the client or the contractor’s positive strategy. For enlightening 
how a benefit sharing policy governs BIM implementation in the construction phase, 𝛽D/$. is 
deducted in an alternative way by following a standard PA model of Hölmstrom and Milgrom’s 
(Hölmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  
Denote the contractor’s actions of using BIM as 𝑎	 𝑎 ∈ 	𝐴 , where 𝐴  is a one-
dimensional vector. Outcomes of contractors’ BIM implementation can be written as yD/$. =	𝑎 + φ. Let 𝑊	 𝑦D/$. = 𝑠	 +	βD/$.∗𝑦D/$. (s > 0) be incentives from clients to contractors that 
Please cite this article as: “Zheng, L., Lu, W., Chen, K., Chau, K.W., and Niu, Y.H. (2017). Benefit sharing for BIM implementation: Tackling 
the moral hazard dilemma in inter-firm cooperation. International Journal of Project Management, 35(3), 393-405.” 
 
 
 
22 
depends on observable yD/$.. Prevailing in the project governance literature, the risk averse 
contractor is a working assumption (e.g. Ward and Chapman 1994). Also because BIM is 
relatively new to contractors, the risk averse and bounded rational contractor may well be 
sensitive to BIM costs. As a result, contractors’ perceived BIM costs 𝑃𝐶D/$. 	𝑎  is very likely 
to be higher than what 𝑓D/$. 	𝑎  actually is. It is thus reasonable to assume 𝑃𝐶D/$. 	𝑎 = 	 'p  
(𝑘	 > 	0), where a higher value of 𝑘 denotes more serious adverse effects of BIM costs on 
contractors. In addition, joint BIM benefits allocated to the contractor can be written as:  𝜋D/$. = 𝑊 − 𝑃𝐶D/$. 	𝑎 = 𝑠 + βD/$.(𝑎 + φ) − 'p                                             (16)                               
Let 𝑅  denote contractors’ random benefits derived from BIM implementation that 
follow the normal distribution function. Let	𝑟	 𝑟 > 	0  be contractors’ risk averse degree, for 
simplicity, 𝑅 can be represented by (3.p , where 𝜎p is the variance that measures how far a 
series of random BIM benefits spread out from their mean value. Further, the certainty 
equivalence of contractors’ BIM benefits can be written as:  
𝐶𝐸(𝜋D/$.) = (𝐸(𝜋D/$.) − 𝑅 ) = 𝑠 + βD/$.𝑎 − 'p − (3.p                            (17)                                                             
Let 𝜋 be contractors’ benefits if they use BIM at 𝐵#$%&'()*∗ . According to the benefit 
sharing baseline (Eq.3), if 𝐶𝐸 𝜋D/$.  is lower than 𝜋 , contractors are inclined to private 
actions instead of cooperation. Therefore, joint BIM benefits allocated to contractors are 
constrained by 𝐶𝐸 𝜋D/$. ≥ 𝜋 . As contractors act for individual-maximization and there 
exists Max 𝜋 ⊨ Max 𝐶𝐸 𝜋D/$. , the consistent condition of incentives from the client to 
the contractor can be computed as	𝑎∗ = 3. . Meanwhile, the client also acts for individual-
maximization, and thus a simultaneous equations system exists in terms of:   
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𝑀𝑎𝑥. yD0*)$. = 𝑀𝑎𝑥. yD/$. − W	 yD/$.s. t. s + βD/$.𝑎 − 'p − (3.p ≥ 𝜋	𝑎∗ = 3.                                                    (18)                        
By solving Eqs.18, the optimal incentive coefficient from the client to the contractor, 
i.e. contractors’ BIM benefit sharing ratio, is computed as: 	βD/$.∗ = kk(                                                                                                 (19) 
Implications of the OLBSM 
The developed OLBSM has significant implications for analyzing incentive mechanisms of 
stimulating AEC firms’ cooperation in BIM implementation. The designer and the contractor 
could be incentivized to cooperate if each of them receives a share of joint BIM benefits not 
lower than the quotient of such stakeholder’s BIM costs over value-creation in the associated 
project phase. The equilibrium analysis of the game between clients and designers also shows 
that clients’ attitudes towards BIM implementation are subject to the value of ℎ, which captures 
how joint BIM benefits could be more than noncooperation outcomes. As implied by 
Proposition I, when joint BIM benefits are not eminent (1 < ℎ < 2), the client would not 
positively support BIM implementation or even not be willing to adopt BIM at all. 
Comparatively, designers perhaps are more inclined to cooperatively using BIM were they 
adequately incentivized, even if implementing BIM is not sufficiently profitable from the 
client’s perspective.  
Moreover, our model indicates that how contractors’ cooperation can be incentivized 
significantly affects both designers and clients’ behaviors associated with BIM implementation, 
as well as plays a crucial role in reaping joint BIM benefits. As shown in Fig. 3, when ℎ 
becomes larger, both the abscissa axis and the longitudinal coordinate of 𝐸v become smaller, 
and zone I expends, suggesting that both the client and the designer are more inclined to 
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adopting positive strategies when implementing BIM, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, given 
determined technological capabilities of BIM, the value of	ℎ is a function of contractors’ BIM 
implementation outcomes. Therefore, it is imperative to maximize ℎ in the construction phase, 
i.e., incentivize contractors to implement BIM at  𝐵∗. Aligning Eq.18 and Eq.19, it can be 
computed that 𝑎∗ = k(k() , which represents contractors’ optimal BIM use degree subject 
to clients’ incentives. Provided that the incentive-alignment between the client and the 
contractor is well devised, 𝑎∗ should be equal to 𝐵∗, which further depends on contractors’ risk 
averse degree, their cognitive knowledge of BIM costs, as well as variances in their randomly 
received BIM benefits.  
Execution procedure for applying the OLBSM 
The execution procedure for applying the OLBSM to BIM-based construction projects is 
suggested as consisting of five steps (Fig. 4). The first step is to identify 𝐵∗ and joint BIM 
benefits therein, because it is worth sharing joint BIM benefits if, and only if 	𝑓 𝐵∗ −
𝑓(𝐵#$%&'()*∗ ) ≤ 𝐶./.'0123456789∗ − 𝐶./.'01∗ . Since the OLBSM has to be stipulated ex-ante, the forecast 
of 𝐵∗ could be depending on traits of a project in plan (e.g. building structure) and extant BIM 
capabilities. 
The second step is for clients to choose an optimal approach to implement 𝐵∗ among 
options such as hiring a BIM consultant and sharing joint BIM benefits with designers and 
contractors. Once a benefit sharing approach is adopted, it is necessary to make 𝐵∗  well 
acknowledged by all stakeholders. The third step is to study costs and benefits governing 
designers and contractors’ BIM implementation policies, and the information of their 𝐵#$%&'()*∗  
as accurately as possible before engaging them into the OLBSM. In this step, attentions have 
to be attached to the fact that, BIM costs could include monetary costs (items can be monetized 
directly such as software, hardware, and labor training) and organizational costs (items that can 
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only be indirectly monetized such as coordination costs, workflow changes and administrations) 
regarding how these two types of costs occur (e.g. one-time or continuously).  
On identifying BIM costs of each stakeholder, the fourth step is to obtain the BIM 
benefit sharing ratios subject to 
β* = VWXVWXYZβi)%. > 849.βD/$.∗ = kk(. Note that the calculation of 𝜉 and ℎ𝜉 should 
consider the present value add by using BIM to the FM phase when stipulating the benefits 
sharing between the client and the designer/contractor. The fifth step is for clients to 
communicate the OLBSM with designers and contractors, and stipulate it in both design and 
construction contracts. This step is necessary to build confidences in designers and contractors 
for taking up cooperative behaviors, i.e. implementing BIM at 𝐵∗. Adequate communications 
about the OLBSM is also helpful to perform the clause that, if 𝐵∗ turns out not having been 
achieved at the end of contracts, designers and contractors will not receive any shares of joint 
BIM benefits other than predetermined minimum payments from clients. 
 
Fig. 4 The execution procedure of the proposed OLBSM 
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Concluding remarks 
Rather than its technology piecemeal that improves particular management activities only, BIM 
is also under the scrutiny of professionals emphasizing it as a lifecycle process requiring inter-
firm cooperation (Succar 2010; Eastman et al. 2011). As such, challenges of better promoting 
BIM are emerging to both the industry and the academia, giving rise to attentions to issues not 
previously addressed—subject to moral hazards under the asymmetric information, it is simply 
impossible for the client to achieve expected joint BIM benefits unless launching a proper 
incentive-alignment mechanism.  
Trading off traditional project management systems against BIM implementation, AEC 
firms are expecting that their individual utilities can be increased. Constrained by their bounded 
rationalities, designers and contractors focusing on self-interests extend no more than their 
private BIM use degrees that are perceived to be the most beneficial, unless the associated cost-
benefit is counterbalanced at a new level. In this paper, an outcome-linked benefit sharing 
model (OLBSM) has been developed to incentivize inter-firm cooperation in the context of 
BIM implementation. In the OLBSM, the optimization problem is solved for reaping cost-
savings for a project overall, and the benefit sharing problem is addressed according to the 
value added by each stakeholder. After sharing joint BIM benefits among clients, designers, 
and contractors in this way, no stakeholder after cooperation has to bear a loss, and thereby is 
motivated to implement BIM more extensively. If properly performed, the OLBSM could help 
the AEC industry develop towards inter-firm cooperation, and thereby realize synergistic 
value-creation of construction projects.  
As innovative as it is, the OLBSM still has several problematic aspects. Firstly, the 
modeling process is suited in a classic PA formalism, where the asymmetric information 
between the principal and agencies is customarily taken. Nevertheless, as it can alleviate the 
degree of asymmetric information between stakeholders, implementing BIM may well lower 
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costs of monitoring agencies’ behaviors (Hölmstrom 1979). Under this condition, it is possible 
that behavior-based benefit sharing methods are more appropriate to offer incentives than 
outcome-linked approaches (Eisenhardt 1989). Secondly, the payment schemes from clients to 
designers/contractors have not been sufficiently discussed, which, however, might influent the 
determination of benefit sharing ratios. For example, designers could charge clients either by 
approved design quantities (DQ) or by design duration (DD). Under DQ contracts, designers 
might be exposed to higher risks of assuming additional BIM costs, while DD contracts might 
leave clients being exposed to higher risks. Thirdly, the above two points further lead to another 
problem that, heterogeneities among different clients, designers, contractors, and projects also 
might affect how to devise optimal benefit sharing approaches.  
Indeed, for designing a proper BIM benefit sharing mechanism, it needs to consider 
manifold factors than what have been discussed in the present study, including calculations of 
each stakeholder’s BIM costs and benefits, the applicability of a particular benefit sharing 
approach, and influences of bi-directional negotiations. The successful design and execution 
of an OLBSM, together with the legitimacy and acceptance of more extensive BIM 
implementations, depend on clear BIM objectives, procedural equities, and inclusive processes, 
as well as engage rigorous analysis of different incentive-alignment options to assess their 
possible effects on both beneficiaries and efforts. In order to ultimately mitigate moral hazards 
and incentivize inter-firm cooperation in BIM implementation, these issues all require further 
explorations. 
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Appendix  
The content analysis method 
The sample. A three-stage strategy was adopted for locating comprehensive articles about BIM 
benefits and costs. Firstly, the English language literature in the “Google Scholar” database 
was screened by searching “BIM benefits” and “BIM cost” headings for the period between 
2004 and 2016. 584 and 203 scholarly articles were located respectively. Secondly, the 
retrieved literature was skimmed through for contents on BIM costs and benefits. After filtering, 
there remained 37 eligible scholarly articles, consisting of 26 journal papers, 8 conference 
papers, and 3 dissertations. Thirdly, the mainstream industry analytics reports have been 
searched, and 19 reports about BIM implementation were retrieved. In total, this search yielded 
56 articles, covering 52 real cases of BIM implementations, which could offer a fairly 
comprehensive sample for the content analysis in the present study.  
Coding Scheme. Retrieved articles are divided into case-based and survey/model-based 
articles according to their methods. Each real case was counted as one vote to a documented 
BIM cost/benefit item, and an article without real cases was counted as one vote to per 
documented item. The sampled articles were sorted according to various casual elements of 
cost/benefit items and different project phases in which these items have been recognized. After 
a preliminary sorting, authors then categorized benefit items into Communication, Productivity, 
Competitiveness, and Coordination; and categorized cost items into Technologies, Labor 
training, Data-checking and Organization costs. When sorting BIM cost/benefit items, numbers 
of votes that each cost/benefit item gained also were marked. The abstracted data was further 
organized by BIM cost/benefit items, their causal elements and gained votes, as project phases 
where they were recognized by the literature (i.e. the design phase, the construction phase, and 
the FM phase).  
Results of the content analysis 
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Table 3 BIM benefits in different project phases 
BIM benefits in the design phase 
Benefit Causal items Votes 
Design productivity 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Design assessments (e.g. energy used) 26 
Higher design quality 15 
Efficient clash detection 15 
Cooperative design 11 
Efficient design changes 8 
Facilitating conceptual design 6 
Design flexibility 5 
Time saving 3 
Minimizing design staffing 2 
BIM design reuse 2 
Communication  
  
  
  
  
Better communicating the design intent 17 
Visualization 16 
Information sharing 4 
Keep pace with market 
competition 
  
  
Design bidding support 1 
Providing new design services 1 
Maintaining working relations with the client 1 
BIM benefits in the construction phase 
Benefit Causal items Votes 
Construction conduction 
support 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Reduced change orders 17 
On budget and cost saving 11 
Improved shop drawings 9 
Safety management 8 
Improved construction quality 8 
Work sequencing improved 7 
Efficient documentation 7 
Material supply management 4 
Environment management 4 
Installation support/instruction 3 
Rework reduced 3 
Preconstruction support 
  
  
  
  
  
Construction planning and constructability assessment 29 
Facilitating scheduling 19 
Clash detection 12 
Spatial coordination 6 
Stakeholder coordination 
  
  
  
  
Improved coordination with other stakeholders 20 
Reduced RFI  12 
Keep pace with market 
competition 
  
Efficient construction tendering 8 
Maintaining working relations with the client 5 
BIM benefits in the operation and maintenance phase 
Benefit Causal items Votes 
Facility management  Facility management and maintenance 7 
Facility management tendering 1 
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Table 4 BIM-imposed costs in different project phases 
Design Phase Construction Phase 
Cost item Votes Cost item Votes 
Technologies 24 Technologies 22 
Labor training 12 Additional coordination 13 
Additional coordination 10 Labor training  12 
Ensuring the data accuracy 6 BIM-based decision review  8 
BIM-based decision review 9 Organization cost 8 
Adding more design details  4 Repurposing BIM design 7 
Early decision-making 3 Developing as-built BIM  6 
BIM consultant 2 BIM-ownership determination 5 
Space requirements 1 BIM consultant 3 
CAD rework cost 1 Contractual cost 2 
Contractual cost 1 Capital cost 2 
  Risk of using a new technology  1 
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